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Abstract 
We examine the impact of competition on bank earnings persistence by exploiting a 
natural experiment following interstate banking deregulation that increased bank 
competition. We find that bank earnings adjustment speed increases after the state where the 
bank locates implements the deregulation.  This relationship is weakened, however, with the 
increase of banks’ abilities to sustain earnings, as reflected in size, diversification, 
managerial efficiency and safety. We further find that compeititon directly impacts bank 
earnings adjustment speed, and does not indirectly go through the channel of earnings 
management.  
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1. Introduction  
Financial crisis raises the recent intense debate on the association between accounting 
changes and financial crisis. For instance, the accusation of market value accounting after 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis, along with the economic significance of banks’ liquidity and 
capital provision requirements, reveals the vital economic role of bank accounting (Beatty 
and Liao, 2014). Bank earnings persistence plays an important role in maintaining the 
stability of the whole financial system and so has attracted growing debate on the factors 
that drive such a phenomenon (Cumming et al., 2012; Beaver et al., 2012; Gao and Zhang, 
2015; Peterson et al., 2015; Hui et al, 2016; Buchner et al., 2016).  
According to economic competition theory, competition contributes to the mean 
reversion of market profitability (decreased earnings persistence) in the long term (Stigler, 
1961; Mueller, 1977, 1986; Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2011). In other words, 
competition could erode away all excessive returns by attracting new entrants or all 
excessive losses by forcing the improvement of operations or exit of the market. Thus, 
competition could directly reduce earnings persistence. However, accounting studies 
implicitly suggest that earnings persistence is a result of earnings management (Sloan, 1993; 
Pope and Wang, 2005; Chen, 2010; Dechow et al., 2010; Skinner and Soltes, 2011; Li, 2010; 
Healy et al., 2015).  
Few studies have attempted to reconcile the differences between theories that explain 
the main driving force of bank earnings persistence. It is possible that, as an effective 
external governance mechanism, competition could reduce earnings management via 
increasing the cost of mispricing (Graham et al., 2005; Dechow et al., 2010; Burks et al., 
2016; Jiang et al., 2016). Hence, the resulted reduced earnings persistence is the result of 
decreased earnings management caused by the increased competition. It is thus the central 
focus of this paper to determine whether the impact of competition on bank earnings 
persistence is directly or indirectly from earnings management.  
We use a comprehensive data set of the US banking industry for the period between 
1986 and 2013 and our final sample includes 15,546 unique commercial banks with 226,153 
firm-year observations. The benefits of studying the banking industry are two-fold: First, our 
focus on a single homogenous industry removes the challenges of defining the market where 
a firm competes, thereby removing the potential bias in industry identification that is overly 
broadly or unduly narrowly defined. Second, the focus of analyzing the banking sector 
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eliminates the concern on conglomerates that operate in different industries and thus face 
competitions in different markets.  
We use a partial adjustment model to capture bank earnings adjustment speed, which 
allows earnings targets to be bank-specific and to vary over time (see, also, Healy et al., 
2014; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; De Jonghe and Öztekin., 2015). Earnings adjustment 
speed refers to the speed at which banks adjust earnings to their target ROA, and equals one 
minus earnings persistence. Thus, faster adjustment speeds indicate lower earnings 
persistence. We estimate heterogeneous adjustment speeds via a two-stage procedure. In the 
first stage, we obtain a constant adjustment speed λ for each bank and estimate the target 
ROA for each bank-year. In the second stage, we use the gap between the target ROA and 
the observed realized ROA to obtain a time-varying adjustment speed for each bank in each 
year.  
We exploit the cross-state, time-varying variation in the removal of interstate bank 
branching prohibitions to identify an exogenous increase in bank competition. The 
introduction of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994 by 
the US authorities relaxed geographical restrictions to bank expansion across state borders. 
This relaxation enhances competition by enabling banks to enter into new markets in other 
states, thereby allowing them to compete with those banks in the local market (DeYoung, 
2010; Rice and Strahan, 2010, among others). 
We start by investigating whether banks adjust their earnings with a faster speed in 
those states that implement the IBBEA and deregulate interstate banking within their borders 
to a great extent. We find that an increase in the Geographic Expansion Index, which 
indicates an increase in bank competition, leads to an increase in bank earnings adjustment 
speed. This finding is in line with the prediction of the economic theory that competition 
reduces earnings persistence (Stigler, 1961). We also find that banks with higher earnings 
management, which is measured as Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions, tend to have slower 
earnings adjustment speed. This finding is in line with the arguments in the extant accounting 
literature. 
Our findings hold after controlling for state and time fixed effects, a wide array of 
time-varying bank characteristics, such as size, risk, capital-asset ratio, efficiency, and 
macroeconomic conditions, such as GDP growth, inflation and GDP per capita in each state. 
We conduct a host of robustness tests to ensure that our findings are not driven by potential 
biases in the sample or alternative explanations. In our additional cross-sectional analysis, 
we find that the impact of bank competition on earnings adjustment speed is reduced with 
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the increase of banks’ abilities to sustain earnings, including size, diversification, managerial 
efficiency and safety. 
Next, we investigate whether the positive impact of competition on bank earnings 
adjustment speed goes through an indirect earnings management channel. If this were true, 
we should expect to find a negative impact of competition on bank earnings management, 
because a higher level of competition would result in lower earnings management, which 
will then lead to higher earnings adjustment speed. The extant literature, however, does not 
provide a widely accepted direction on the relationship between firm competition and 
earnings management. The researchers who advocate a negative relationship argue that 
competition acts as an external governance mechanism, which prevents managerial slack 
and protects the interest of shareholders (Dechow et al., 2010), and that competition 
increases the cost of misreporting, thereby curbing earnings management incentives 
(Graham et al., 2005).  
On the other hand, if the positive impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment 
speed does not go through the earnings management channel, we expect to find a non-
negative (positive or insignificant) impact of competition on bank earnings management. 
This will then be consistent with another strand of the literature which argues that increased 
competition puts higher pressure on managers and hence, induces managers’ unethical 
behaviors such as earnings management, giving rise to an empirically observed positive 
relation between competition and earnings management (Shleifer, 2004; Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Bagnoli and Watts, 2010; Tomy, 2016; Dou et 
al., 2016).  
To answer this question, we conduct two analyses to examine whether competition 
exerts a positive impact on bank earnings management by using two bank earnings 
management frameworks. First, we use discretionary loan loss provisions, which is widely 
used to measure earnings management in the banking industry (see, e.g., Beatty et al., 2002; 
Cohen et al., 2014; Cornett et al., 2009; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Beatty and Liao, 2014). 
We indeed find a positive relation between competition and discretionary loan loss 
provisions. Thus, our evidence does not support the argument that the impact of competition 
on bank earnings adjustment speed goes indirectly through the channel of earnings 
management.  
Second, we consider the possibility that banks may use securities available for sale to 
smooth earnings, as suggested by the recent findings of Barth et al. (2015), and Dong and 
Zhang (2015). Available for Sale (AFS) securities is the largest category of banks’ securities 
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that comprise a sizable proportion of bank assets (Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 
2010). It is less costly to conduct earnings management via realizing gains and losses on 
AFS securities than via managing accruals or by involving in real activities because sales of 
securities are not subject to ex post scrutiny by professional institutions such as auditors. 
This advantage may therefore enables banks to continuously manage earnings despite facing 
competition. If this is true, regardless of whether competition is strong or weak, banks can 
manage AFS to achieve the purpose of earnings management via. Our evidence supports this 
argument, and again suggests that competition directly impacts bank earnings persistence, 
rather than indirectly going through the channel of earnings management. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to our best knowledge, 
we are the first to document the causal relation between competition and earnings persistence 
by employing Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act as an exogenous shock. Prior 
studies tend to ignore the endogeneity with respect to the causal relation between 
competition and earnings persistence (Goddard et al., 2004; Gropp and Kashyap, 2010; 
Goddard et al., 2011). Recently, Healy et al. (2014) recognize that it is difficult to attribute 
causality between competition and earnings persistence, given many channels that drive 
competitive forces, such as government regulation. Our study fills this gap by employing a 
government regulation change as an exogenous shock that impacts bank competition.   
Second, we examine whether the competition law affects banks with different size, 
level of diversification, management efficiency, and level of default risk. We find that the 
stronger a bank is in its ability to sustain earnings, as reflected by having a large size, better 
diversification, higher managerial efficiency and lower default risk, the lower is the impact 
of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed. Third, we provide evidence that the effect 
of competition on bank earnings persistence is direct, but not indirectly through the channel 
of earnings management.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents conceptual framework. 
In Section 3, we describe our identification strategy, sample construction, instruments, 
models and summary statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses our main results and Section 
5 conducts two additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Conceptual framework 
Economic scholars argue that competition directly impacts earnings persistence, 
where competition could erode away all economic excessive returns and losses in the long 
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run and thus, the market profitability level will converge toward a long-term equilibrium 
(Stigler, 1961; Mueller, 1977, 1986; Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2011). More 
specifically, the excessive profit currently possessed by a firm attracts new competitors to 
enter the market by offering similar or same product with lower prices, leading to decreases 
in the profit margin. This process will not stop until firms’ profitability reaches the average 
profit rate of the market. For firms with the profits under the market average will receive 
precaution from investors to reach the market average level in a short time. Otherwise, 
investors will withdraw their investment, resulting in the exit of the underperforming firms 
from the market. Thus, competition directly reduces earnings persistence.   
On the other hand, there is a widely accepted consensus that earnings persistence is 
a result of earnings management choice or earnings manipulation (Sloan, 1993; Pope and 
Wang, 2005; Chen, 2010; Dechow et al., 2010; Skinner and Soltes, 2011). The underpinning 
rationale is that, with information asymmetry between managers and investors, firms smooth 
earnings for purposes like taxes minimization, dividend payouts, target achievements, hiding 
poor economic performance or avoidance of covenants (Guay et al., 1996; Arya et al., 1998; 
Burgstahler et al., 2006). Managers are also motivated to smooth reported earnings overtime 
to obtain relatively constant compensation (Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995; 
Healy, 1985; Warfield et al., 1995; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). For instance, 
managers might manipulate earnings downward when bonuses have already reached 
maximum levels, and might manipulate earnings upward when the actual earnings are not 
qualified for a bonus plan. Subjecting to regulatory capital requirements, banks with lower 
regulatory capital are motivated to increase it. Consequently, banks might manipulate 
earnings to accomplish that objective (Barth et al., 2015).  
 
3. Data and variables 
3.1. Data 
To explore the impact of competition and earnings management on earnings 
persistence, we combine data from several sources. From Federal Reserve Report of 
Condition and Income (Call Reports), we obtain the data of balance sheets and income 
statements at the commercial bank level, rather than their bank holding company levels. We 
exclude from our sample foreign banks and banks with total assets less than one million US 
dollars. Macroeconomic information is from World Bank database. Finally, our full sample 
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includes 15,546 banks with a total of 226,153 firm-year observations from 51 states over the 
period of 1986-2013.  
 
3.2. The identification strategy of bank competition 
Prior studies use different measures, such as country survey index, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, and the Lerner Index, to measure competition at the country, industry, 
firm or product level (Healy et al., 2014; Goddard et al., 2004; Goddard et al., 2011; Berger 
et al., 2000). These measures, however, cannot address the endogeneity issues between 
competition and earnings persistence because unobservable cross-sectional heterogeneity 
could impact both competition and earnings persistence. On the other hand, reverse causality 
may also exist. For example, persistent earnings of the industry may indicate better business 
operations, continuous profits, increasing stock prices and lower debt costs (Lin et al., 2013) 
and hence, can attract new competitor entrants. Alternatively, persistent earnings of the firm 
may increase the capability of existing firms in preventing new entrants into the market, 
resulting in less competition.   
We use Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA), which relaxes 
geographical restrictions on bank expansion crossing state borders enacted by the US 
authorities in 1994, as an exogenous shock to document the causality between competition 
and earnings persistence. Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) was 
passed in 1994 and completed in 1997. It allows bank holding companies to acquire banks 
across states (effective in 1995) and to expand across states (effective in 1997) (Rice and 
Strahan, 2010). Regarded as the watershed event, IBBEA indicates the end of an era of 
geographic restrictions on bank expansion which could be traced back to the 19th century 
(Rice and Strahan, 2010).  
The passage of IBBEA mainly involves the relaxation of four restrictions: (1) Age 
restriction: State could impose a minimum existence year for banks that seek to enter. Many 
states set their age requirement at 5 years, while several states set a lower age requirement 
(eg.3 years) or no minimum age limit at all. (2) De novo interstate branching restriction: 
states could disallow de novo interstate bank branching, under which situation, all out-of-
state banks could only open one branch in the focal state. This makes entry into certain out-
of-state markets particularly difficult, because the potential of fast expansion of an out-of-
state bank is significantly constrained. (3) Individual branching acquisition restriction: in an 
interstate merger transaction, states could require an out-of-state bank (Bidder) to acquire all 
branches of an in-state bank (Asker). Like de novo branching, permitting acquisition of 
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individual branches lowers the cost of entry for interstate banks. (4) Statewide cap on 
deposits restriction: states could restrict the maximum fraction of deposits that an out-of-
state bank could hold. Officially, a cap of 30% is suggested by IBBEA, but each state 
maintains the discretion to change it. States could set a deposit cap to prevent a large in-state 
bank from entering into an interstate merger. For example, if a state sets a deposit cap of 
20%, a bank in that state with more than 20% statewide deposits fraction could not be 
acquired.    
This Act allows states to erect barriers to branch expansion. However, some states 
make use of this provision by prohibiting out-of-state banks from opening or acquiring 
branches, by requiring the minimum age of bank branches that could be acquired, or by 
mandating the maximum amount of deposits that banks could hold. Therefore, IBBEA 
increases banks’ competition in each state while the magnitude of increased competition in 
each estate is different. Following Rice and Strahan (2010), we create a variable called: 
‘Geographic Expansion Index’, which decreases with the extent of interstate branching 
deregulation restrictions in a state. Hence, an increase in the Geographic Expansion Index 
indicates an increase in bank competition.  
It is important to note that interstate bank deregulation is exogenous to bank earnings 
persistence. There is no empirical evidence to show that banks’ earnings persistence affects 
the timing of deregulation. Thus, the interstate bank deregulation Act tends to be a disordered 
act that provides a valuable research laboratory for assessing the influence of competition 
on banks’ earnings persistence. There are also extensive studies applying IBBEA as an 
exogenous shock to bank competition on topics of firm financing (Rice and Strahan, 2010), 
firm innovation (Cornaggia et al., 2015; Amore et al., 2013), bank liquidity (Shenoy and 
Williams, 2015) and market valuation of bank holding companies (Goetz et al., 2013), 
among others.  
 
3.3. Earnings management measure: Discretionary loan loss provision model 
Discretionary loan loss provision becomes the most common vehicle to manipulate 
bank earnings after the launch of Statements of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 
(short for SFAS 133), which requires firms to measure total assets and liabilities at fair value 
on the balance sheet (Liu and Ryan, 2006). We hence follow Beatty and Liao (2014), Cohen 
et al. (2014), Cornett et al. (2009) and Cheng and Warfield (2005) to use the discretionary 
loan loss provision (DLLP) model to measure bank earnings management. The absolute 
value of the residual from estimating equation (1) as shown below represents the degree of 
9 
 
each bank’s earnings management. The error term represents the unexplained component of 
the regression and hence, is treated as the Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions (DLLP). 
Loan Loss Provisionit = 𝛽1Sizeit + 𝛽2 ΔLoan Charge-offsit 
                                           + 𝛽3ΔLoansit  + 𝛽4ΔNon-performing Loansit   
                                            + 𝛽5ΔNon-performing Loansit-1  
                                       + 𝛽6ΔNon-performing Loansit+1 + ε𝑖𝑡   (1)               
where Sizeit is the natural logarithm of total assets, ΔLoan Charge-offsit represents the 
difference in total loan charge-offs between periods t and t-1, ΔLoansit represents the 
difference in total loans between periods t and t-1, ΔNon-performing Loansit reflects the 
change in non-performing loans between periods t and t-1, ΔNon-performing Loansit-1 
reflects the change in non-performing loans between periods t-1 and t-2, and ΔNon-
performing Loansit+1 represents the change in non-performing loans between periods t+1 
and t. All the variables except Size in Equation (1) are deflated by the book value of total 
assets of each bank.  
 
3.4. Earnings adjustment speed: The partial adjustment model 
A number of studies use a first-order autoregressive model to capture the dynamics of 
firm’s earnings (Mueller, 1990; Jenny and Weber, 1990). This model can only produce a 
time-invariant persistence level for each entity. However, the persistence level of each entity 
in every year may not remain unchanged. In order to improve the estimation accuracy, 
several studies adopt partial adjustment model to obtain time-varying persistence level for 
each entity (Healey et al., 2014; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Memmel and Raupach, 2010; De 
Jonghe and Öztehin, 2015). We follow these studies and employ the partial adjustment 
model to estimate the dynamic persistence level for each bank in each year. 
In the partial adjustment model, the bank’s current return level (ROA) is a weighted 
average of its target and its previous year’s ROA: 
ROAit - ROAit-1  = λi(ROA*it - ROAit-1) + εit,                                     (2) 
where ROAit is the return on total assets of bank i in year t. ROA*it is the target ROA of bank 
i in year t. λi represents the proportional adjustment for bank i. In our context, λi captures the 
exw a bank operates away from its target ROA. Alternatively, ROA is predicted to mean 
revert to a target level, ROA*. Therefore, bank earnings adjustment speed refers to the speed 
at which banks’ earnings adjust to their target ROA and equals 1 minus earnings persistence. 
The ROA* can be determined by a cross-sectional model: 
10 
 
ROA*it = βi Xit + εit,                                                                           (3) 
where Xit is a vector of the bank and macroeconomic characteristics influencing ROA. 
Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (2) and rearranging yields Equation (4) below: 
ROAit =λi𝛽𝑖Xit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡,                                              (4)         
 Equation (4) shows that in the partial adjustment model, the bank’s current ROA is 
a weighted average (with λi between 0 and 1) of ROA in its previous period, the unobserved 
fixed effects and random shocks. If the value of λi is small, the adjustment speed is slow, 
suggesting that it takes a long time for a bank to reach its target ROA after a shock to its 
ROA. On the other hand, known as an inertial fact in the partial adjustment model, (1- λi) 
represents the earnings persistence level. The smaller value of adjustment speed indicates a 
higher level of earnings persistence. When (1 - λi) equals 1, the adjustment speed equals 0, 
indicating that the earnings level is unchanged. In contrast, when (1 - λi) equals 0, the 
adjustment speed equals 1, suggesting that there is no earnings persistence because the speed 
of adjustment to the target ROA is instant. 
In the partial adjustment model, the target ROA (ROA*) is unobservable and is not 
necessarily constant over periods. Therefore, we employ the cross-sectional model proposed 
by Fama and French (2006) to estimate the target ROA1.  
ROA*it = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Income Diversificationit + 𝛽2Non-Performing Loansit  
                + 𝛽3Revenueit + 𝛽4Capital Ratioit + 𝛽5Sizeit  
                        + 𝛽6Management Efficiencyit   + 𝛽7Loansit + 𝜀𝑖𝑡          (5) 
where Income Diversification is the non-interest income to total revenue ratio, the variable 
of Non-performing Loans is the non-performing loans to total asset ratio, Revenue is total 
revenue to total asset ratio and the Capital Ratio is total equity to total assets ratio, Size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Management Efficiency is calculated via total costs 
divided by total revenues, and Loans is the total net loans over total assets. We employee 
Fama-Macbeth estimation in this first stage estimation (see, also, Fama and French, 2006; 
Healy et al, 2014).  
The above model for estimating the target ROA uses contemporaneous variables, for 
which Healy et al. (2014) demonstrate to be sufficient to predict the target ROA. The 
adjustments are meaningful if there is a difference between the target ROA and the actual 
ROA. The GAP is applied to define the difference between these two variables: 
                                                 
1 The variables used in equation (5) are different from those used in Fama and French (2006) because 
our focus is on the banking industry that they do not analyze.  
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GAPit = ROA
*
it - ROAit                                                               (6) 
To test what determines the dynamic of bank earnings adjustment speed. We modify 
the empirical setup described in Equation (2) and adjust the model such that the adjustment 
speed, λ, can vary over time and banks: 
λit= λi+𝛾Zit-1                                                                               (7) 
We assume that λit is dynamic and varies across banks and over time. 𝛾 is a vector of 
coefficients for the adjustment speed function and Zit-1 is a vector of the bank and 
macroeconomic characteristics that could affect adjustment speed. Substituting Equation (7) 
into Equation (2) yields the specification for a partial adjustment model with dynamic 
adjustment speed λit, that is heterogeneous:  
ROAit - ROAit-1 = (λi + 𝛾Zit-1) GAPit-1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                (8) 
We follow Healy et al, (2014) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) to estimate Equation 
(8) in two steps. In the first step, we use Fama-Macbeth regression for Equation (4) and 
obtain an estimate of target ROA (i.e., ROAit*) (see, also, Fama and French, 2006; Healy et 
al, 2014). Then, we use Equation (6) to calculate the earnings GAP for each bank in each 
year. In the second stage analysis, we follow De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) and use OLS 
with bank and year fixed effects. Heterogeneity robust standard errors are clustered at bank 
level (for robustness, we also conducted several alternative clustering methods and our 
conclusions are not changed). Having running regression as in Equation (8), we obtain a set 
of coefficients 𝛾. These coefficients allow us to directly test how bank’s competition and 
earnings management influence earnings adjustment speed. The sign of 𝛾  reflects the 
relationship between Z and the adjustment speed.  
 
3.5. Summary statistics  
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of variables. Appendix I shows the definitions 
of the variables. We winsorize all variables except Size at the 1st and 99th percentiles to 
mitigate the influence of outliers. The mean value of target ROA is 1.048% and the mean 
value of realized ROA is 0.974%, resulting in a positive GAP of 0.09%. These figures are 
consistent with studies that use Call Reports database (Beatty et al., 2002; Ellul and 
Yerramilli, 2013). Geographic Expansion Index ranges from zero to four and the mean value 
of this index is 2.06, indicating that the US states overall apply IBBEA but create on average 
two barriers for interstate branching. The absolute mean value of Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions (i.e., earnings management) is 0.44, which accounts for 0.278% of total assets (= 
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0.44 multiplied by the mean value of Loan to asset). The mean value of realized gains and 
losses of AFS is 0.004. 
The average Z-score of US banks is around 24. On average, US banks lend 63% of 
their assets as loans and hold 9.8% equity to assets ratio. The average total assets of US 
banks is 705 million dollars. The average asset growth is equal to 8.7%. The average value 
of one minus costs to income ratio, a proxy for banks’ managerial efficiency, is equal to 
20.8%. The US banks, on average, generate around 10% of total revenue from non-interest 
income. Both the GDP growth and Inflation range from 2% to 3%. In addition, we found 
discretionary loan loss provisions have a slight increase after the introduction of IBBEA. Z-
score increased from 24 to 25, on average. The mean of capital ratio leveled up from 9.3% 
to 10.2%, showing that banks in general reserved more equity after deregulation. The 
average lending and diversification have grown as well. Meanwhile, banks improved their 
cost-efficiency by 2.7%, on average.      
<Insert Table 1 here> 
 
Table 2 reports the correlations between the variables used in this study. Geographic 
Expansion Index and Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions are positively correlated, showing 
that banks that operate in those states with lower regulatory restrictions use more earnings 
management. Most of the correlations are modest and the multicollinearity problem is 
limited.  
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. The impact of Interstate banking deregulation on earnings adjustment speed  
Table 3 presents the regression results of Equation (4) for the first stage Fama-
MecBeth (1973) estimation. Most of the lagged variables that explain the target ROA have 
significant coefficients with expected signs, except for the insignificant coefficient on 
Capital ratiot-1. The coefficient estimate on the lagged ROA indicates that the constant 
adjustment speed of earnings persistence in the first-stage specification is 0.488 per year (= 
1- 0.512).   
<Insert Table 3 here> 
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Table 4 reports the regression results for the second-stage estimation of Equation (8). 
We consider a ten-year window of the introduction of IBBEA which lasts for three years 
from 1994 to 1997. Specifically, we use 5 years before and after the introduction of IBBEA 
Act for each state to examine the effect of IBBEA. Because different states adopt the 
regulation changes in different years, therefore our ten-year window vary across different 
states. For example, Ohio State instantly relieved all four restrictions on the 21th May 1997, 
therefore the data for Ohio spans a ten-year window from 1992 to 2002. On the other hand, 
Washington State firstly relieved state deposit cap restriction on the 6th June 1996 and then 
gradually relieved other restrictions in following years. Since we consider a ten-year window 
around the first introduction of IBBEA, the data for Washington hence spans from 1991 to 
2001. Thus, the overall time period for all states spans from 1989 to 2002. This allows us to 
capture the effect of dramatic changes of deregulation across states and time.  
We standardize all the explanatory variables in the regression, except for Geographic 
Expansion Index because this index is an ordinal variable rather than a continuous variable. 
The coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is positive and significant. Since a higher 
Geographic Expansion Index value indicates higher competition, a positive regression 
coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index indicates that banks in more competitive markets 
tend to adjust their earnings at a higher speed. As shown in Column (1) of Table 4, a one 
inter-quartile increase of Geographic Expansion Index leads to an increase of earnings 
adjustment speed by 9.4%. This result is in accordance with economic competition theory 
that competition impacts earnings persistence by eroding away economic excessive returns 
and losses in the long run (Stigler, 1961).  
In Column (2) of Table 4, the coefficient of Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions is 
negative and significant, suggesting that banks with higher earnings management tend to 
have a slow earnings adjustment speed. Earnings adjustment speed will decrease by 4.8% 
(0.178*0.27) if Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions rises by one standard deviation. This 
result also supports the widely documented opinion that the principle purpose of earnings 
management is to smooth earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver et 
al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995). In addition, we find that the coefficients of Capital Ratio 
are significant and positive, indicating that banks with higher capital ratio adjust earnings 
faster. Size shows a significantly negative impact on the adjustment speed, suggesting that 
larger banks tend to have more persistent earnings than their smaller counterparts. A one 
standard deviation increase in Size decreases the adjustment speed by 0.324% (0.054*0.06). 
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Managerial Efficiency is also significantly and positively related to earnings adjustment 
speed.  
We conduct further analysis to examine whether the positive impact of bank 
competition on earnings adjustment speed is driven by those banks with earnings below their 
target (positive GAP), because these banks tend to have more incentives to adjust their 
earnings to their target levels than their better performed peer banks. We re-run the 
regressions on the subsample of banks with positive and negative GAP, respectively. The 
results are reported in Column (4) and (5) of Table 4. We find that the coefficients on 
Geographic Expansion index remain positive and significant in both specifications. It 
suggests that our main results are not driven by those banks with earnings below their target 
(positive GAP), and competition consistently erodes away the economic excessive returns 
(GAP<0) and expel losses (GAP>0) (Stigler, 1961).  
  
<Insert Table 4 here> 
 
4.2. Robustness analyses 
We also conduct additional tests to ensure that our results presented in Table 4 are not 
driven by potential biases in the sample or due to alternative explanations. Table 5 reports 
the results.  
First, there exists a potential concern that our results may be driven by states that time 
their interstate bank branching deregulations to coincide with a higher level of bank earnings 
persistence. Thus, the positive coefficient estimates on Geographic Expansion Index in the 
previous regressions may simply reflect a trend of rising adjustment speed after the IBBEA 
deregulation. To address this concern, we further conduct the following empirical analysis. 
We follow Krishnan et al. (2014), and introduce the Before (4,1) dummy variable, which 
equals one for the years t-4 to t-1 preceding the deregulation year t. This variable captures 
the difference in earnings adjustment speed of banks in each state between the four-year 
period t-4 to t-1 prior to the deregulation year t and the years prior to the four-year period, t-
5 and earlier, before the deregulation. If the deregulations are due to states trying to time 
earnings persistence or if our results above represent a secular trend in earnings persistence, 
the coefficient estimate on Before (4,1) dummy should be positive and statistically 
significant. We do not find such evidence. In Column (1) of Table 5, the coefficient estimate 
of the Before (4,1) dummy is statistically insignificant. 
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Second, if our results reflect a treatment effect of interstate bank branching 
deregulations by states, our results should disappear if we falsely assume that our treatment 
occurs one year prior to the actual deregulation year (Roberts and Whitted, 2011; Krishnan 
et al., 2014). For these tests, we repeat our main regressions of Equation (8) under such false 
definitions of Geographic Expansion Index, which takes the index value one year before the 
actual deregulation year. Column (2) of Table 5 reports that the coefficient estimate on the 
falsified Geographic Expansion Index is statistically insignificant. This result confirms that 
interstate bank branching law were not enacted under certain circumstances that coincide 
with other unobservable characteristics that also lifted bank earnings persistence. 
Furthermore, these results also indicate that reverse causality does not drive our results.  
Third, in order to examine the influence of deregulation over a long time horizon, we 
expand our sample for the main regression of Equation (8) to the time period of 1986 to 
2013. As shown in Column (3) of Table 5, the coefficient is significantly positive, which is 
the same as and consistent with those reported in Table 4. Fourth, we consider the potential 
bias by banks operating in multiple states. Thus, we restrict our sample to those banks with 
only one branch and banks with size below USD 100 million, respectively. The results 
reported in column (4) and (5) are consistent with our main findings. 
Fifth, we are concerned with the confounding effect of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
of 1999, which allows banks to diversify into various businesses. The literature suggests that 
the GLB Act of 1999 impacts on market competition (Chronopoulos, Liu, McMillan and 
Wilson, 2015) and hence may also affect bank earnings adjustment speed. However, it is 
empirically difficult to disentangle the effect of GLB Act from the impact of Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 since the impact of both Acts may 
have overlapping time periods immediately after 1999.  In order to find a clean effect from 
IBBEA 1994, we repeat our main regression analysis using the sub-sample before year 1999 
and find consistent results reported in Column (6). Sixth, we use standard errors that are 
clustered at the bank, state and state-year level. The coefficients of Geographic Expansion 
Index across column (7) to column (9) continue to be statistically significant at 1% level.  
Finally, as reported in Table 5B, we conduct a robustness test using event difference-
in-difference strategy following Bertrand and Mullianathan (2003), and Chemmanur, He and 
Nandy (2010) to further test whether our main results are sensitive to different methods. This 
method captures the dynamic variation of the difference between the treatment and control 
groups around a particular event. It could also prevent us from producing underestimated 
small standard errors by including a too long sample period in a difference-in-difference 
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estimation (Bertrand et al. 2004)). We treat the introduction year of IBBEA for each state 
as our event year. We use the following model to test the dynamic impact from IBBEA on 
earnings adjustment speed: 
ROAit - ROAit-1=(∑Beforet+∑Aftert+γZit-1) GAPit-1+ 𝜀it,       (9) 
where GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1, Before
t (Aftert) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for t years 
before (after) the introduction of deregulation of a state. For example, Before5 equals 1 for 
year 5 before a particular state’s deregulation introduction year, and 0 otherwise. We find 
that the coefficients on After1, After2, After3, After4 are all positive and statistically 
significant. This result shows that after the introduction of deregulation, banks accelerate 
earnings adjustment speed. This effect is most pronounced 2 and 3 years after the 
introduction year. These results are consistent with our main results.  
 
<Insert Table 5A here> 
<Insert Table 5B here> 
 
4.3. The effect of banks’ heterogeneous ability to sustain earnings on earnings 
persistence 
In the previous sections we have established causality between competition and bank 
earnings adjustment speed. In this subsection, we attempt to strengthen the interpretation of 
this relation by exploring the impact of banks’ heterogenous abilities in sustaining earnings, 
which affects their earnings adjustment speed. The hypothesis is that the impact of 
competition on bank earnings adjustment speed should be less strong for banks with higher 
level of ability to sustain their previous years’ earnings.  
Specifically, we expect that banks with larger size, higher level of diversification, 
more efficient in management and lower level of default risk have stronger ability to sustain 
earnings. A large bank size usually indicates comprehensive strength, which may help banks 
increase their earnings persistence. Product diversification reflects banks’ business 
expansion, which increases banks’ attractiveness to customers (De Young and Rice (2004) 
and Stiroh and Rumble (2006)). Further, income diversification effectively reduces earnings 
volatility caused by a particular external event. Banks’ safety and soundness could reduce 
banks’ default risk induced by external shocks. Efficient bank  management not only reduces 
operation costs but also makes timely and effective strategies to mitigate loss caused by 
external changes or is even able to find opportunities in external crises (Lin and Zhang, 2010; 
Shehzad et al., 2010). 
17 
 
In the empirical analysis, we introduce four variables, size, diversification, 
managerial efficiency, and Z-score, and their interaction terms with the Geographic 
Expansion Index. Table 6 presents the regression results. The relations between the 
interaction terms of size, diversification, managerial efficiency and Z-score and earnings 
adjustment speed, respectively, are negative and significant. These results indicate that banks 
with larger size, higher level of diversification, higher managerial efficiency and lower level 
of default risk could persist earnings longer and hence, the impact of competition of earnings 
adjustment speed is less stronger. 
 
<Insert Table 6 here> 
 
5. The impact of competition on earnings management 
In the previous sections we document a positive impact of bank competition and a 
negative impact of bank earnings management on bank earnings adjustment speed. Our 
findings emphasize that the impact of bank competition on earnings adjustment speed is 
direct and causal. However, the accounting literature emphasizes the role of earnings 
management in shaping the relation between competition and earnings persistence (Li, 2010; 
Healy et al., 2014).  
This argument implicitly suggests that competition may indirectly impact earnings 
persistence through the channel of earnings management because an increased competition 
could lead to lower level of earnings management. The reasoning is that competition 
increases the cost of misreporting, thereby curbing the incentives of earnings management. 
With more competitive rivals, firms are more likely to lose their shareholders, customers and 
suppliers due to the damage of reputation caused by misreporting (Graham et al., 2005). 
Consequently, it is possible that competition reduces earnings management and that such a 
reduced earnings management results in a lower level of earnings persistence, or 
equivalently speaking, a higher speed of earnings adjustment, as we found in. We investigate 
whether this indirect channel may exist and drive our main results by using two earnings 
management models in this section.  
 
5.1. The impact of competition on Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions (DLLP) 
          In this subsection we examine the direct impact of bank competition on bank earnings 
management, as measured by discretionary loan loss provisions. If it is indeed that bank 
competition impact on earnings persistence indirectly through the earnings management 
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channel, we would expect a negative relationship between the Geographic Expansion Index 
and our bank earnings management measure, otherwise the impact of competition on 
earnings adjustment speed would not be positive.  
Table 7 presents the results. The coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is 
significantly positive, indicating the positive impact of bank competition on earnings 
management. In Column (1), a one inter-quartile increase in the Geographic Expansion 
Index leads to an increase of 0.018% in Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. These results 
support the recent growing studies that find that bank competition encourages bank earnings 
management. For instance, Tomy et al. (2016) argue that banks would inflate loss provisions, 
which reduces reported earnings and hence discourages the entry of new banks. Dou, Ryan, 
and Zou (2016) argue that banks would suppress loan provisions, which creates the 
impression of high underwriting quality and hence helps deter the entry of new banks. Our 
evidence does not support the notion that competition reduces earnings management (see, 
e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2016; Burks et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016).  
We further examine whether the impact of bank competition on earnings management 
is driven by banks with earnings above their targets (GAP<0), because these outperforming 
banks have more incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid sudden drops in earnings. We 
thus re-run the regressions with two sub-samples of banks with earnings below (GAP>0) 
and above (GAP<0) their target, respectively. Column (2) and (3) of Table 7 report the 
results. We find that the coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is significantly positive 
only in the GAP<0 regression but not in the GAP>0 regression. These results indicate that 
the impact of bank competition on earnings management is driven by banks that have higher 
ROA than their targets (GAP<0). 
 <Insert Table 7 here> 
 
5.2. The impact of competition on bank earnings management through Available 
for Sale Securities (AFS securities) 
Prior research documents that banks tend to use the item of available for sale (AFS) 
securities to smooth earnings (Barth et al., 2017; Dong and Zhang, 2015). AFS securities is 
the largest category of banks’ securities and contains a sizable proportion of bank assets 
(Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010). Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 320 
specifies that AFS securities should be measured as fair value in the statement of financial 
position, with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive income. Hence, the 
accounting treatment for gains and losses from AFS securities provides banks a chance to 
19 
 
engage in earnings management by selling these securities and realizing selected gains and 
losses. After the announcement of Accounting Standard Codification (ASC) 320, it is 
increasingly popular that banks use AFS securities to manage earnings due to large size of 
this item and lower cost of managing this item (Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 
2010).  
In this Section, we examine whether competition induces earnings smoothing via 
utilizing the AFS securities. Following Barth et al. (2017) and Dong and Zhang (2015), we 
use realized gains and losses of AFS securities model to capture bank earnings management. 
We estimate the following model: 
  AFS securitiesit = 𝛽1Net Incomeit + 𝛽2 Competitionit  
                             + 𝛽3 Net Incomeit х Competitionit   
                                           + 𝛽4Discretionary Loan Loss Provisionsit +𝛽5Z-scoreit  
                             + 𝛽6Capital Ratioit +𝛽7 Loan to Total Assetit + 𝛽8Sizeit  
                             + 𝛽9Total Assets Growth Rateit + 𝛽10Managerial Efficiencyit  
                             + 𝛽11Income Diversificationit + 𝛽12GDP Growth Rateit  
                             + 𝛽13Inflationit + 𝛽14GDP Per Capitait + ε𝑖𝑡               (10) 
where AFS securitiesit is realized gains and losses on AFS securities and Net Incomeit is net 
income before taxes and gains and losses on AFS securities, both deflated by beginning-of-
year total assets. Competitionit is the Geographic Expansion Index. If banks employ AFS 
securities to maintain persistent earnings, the coefficient on Net Incomeit,  𝛽1, should be 
negative, and if banks under more competition realize more gains from AFS securities, the 
coefficient on Competitionit, 𝛽2, should be positive. Our interested coefficient is 𝛽3, the 
interaction term between Net Incomeit and Competitionit.. It tests whether earnings 
smoothing is more pronounced for banks under higher competition. A negative 𝛽3 implies 
that competition would directly intensify banks earnings smoothing behavior. 2 
The results are reported in Table 8. In column (1), net income before tax is negatively 
related to realized gains and losses of AFS securities. This finding suggests that banks use 
AFS securities to smooth earnings, which is consistent with Barth et al. (2017). The 
interaction term of Geographic Expansion Index and Net Income is insignificant, indicating 
that bank competition does not induce more earnings smoothing by utilizing AFS securities. 
Column (2) and (3) consistently show insignificant coefficients on the interaction term of 
                                                 
2 It is worth to note that the model of Barth et al., (2017) only allows us to check whether banks use 
AFS securities to smooth earnings, but not the magnitude of this earnings management. 
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Geographic Expansion Index and Net Income when we consider the sub-samples when GAP 
>0 and GAP<0, respectively. These results further confirm our main findings that bank 
competition has a direct rather than indirect impact on bank earnings persistence through the 
channel of earnings management.  
 
<Insert Table 8 here> 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this study we investigate whether competition directly affects bank earnings 
persistence or indirectly go through the channel of earnings management. We employ a 
sample of commercial banks in the U.S. from 1986 to 2013. We use the introduction of the 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) as a natural experiment of 
competition, which could effectively mitigate endogeneity issues in prior research. By 
applying a two-stage partial adjustment model, we find a negative impact of competition on 
earnings persistence, consistent with economic competition theory that competition directly 
impacts earnings persistence. O the other hand, we do not find a negative relation between 
competition and earnings management, although we find a positive relation between 
earnings management and persistence. Therefore, our evidence rules out the possibility that 
competition could indirectly decrease earnings persistence through the channel of earnings 
management. 
Our findings are useful for scholars and practitioners, who seek to understand bank 
earnings persistence. The implication for policy makers is to pay attention to form a healthy 
competition environment for existing banks while at the same time encourage information 
disclosure quality. As a result, investors could obtain more valuable information regarding 
banks performance and the banking industry could become more stable, contributing to the 
stability of the financial system.  
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Table 1 
Panel A Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for banks during the period of five years before and five years after the 
year when the IBBEA act was introduced in each state. ROA* is estimated using the first stage of the partial 
adjustment model, ROAit =λi𝛽iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ 𝜀it, GAPit=ROA*it-1-ROAit-1.  ΔROA= ROAit-ROAit-1. We 
use Fama-Macbeth regression to estimate the ROA* in the first stage. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Name Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Target ROA(ROA*) 77929 1.048 0.530 -2.834 2.424 
ROA 77929 0.974 0.723 -4.440 2.961 
GAP 77929 0.091 0.766 -2.908 4.520 
ΔROA 77929 0.030 0.682 -7.401 7.401 
Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions 
77929 0.435 0.270 0.011 1.319 
Realized gains and losses 
of AFS 
77929 0.004 0.052 -6.433 8.044 
Geographic Expansion 
Index 
77929 2.060 1.907 0.000 4.000 
Z-score 77929 24.132 17.069 0.428 83.816 
Capital Ratio 77929 9.799 3.460 3.992 36.872 
Loan to Total Asset 77929 63.118 20.751 13.274 148.805 
Total Assets (million) 77929 705.256 15091.220 0.723 1746242.000 
Size (Log total Asset) 77929 11.339 1.296 8.679 15.734 
Total Assets Growth  77929 8.686 15.879 -18.691 125.575 
Managerial Efficiency 77929 20.808 8.741 -4.076 45.923 
Income Diversification 77929 10.131 7.519 0.492 53.253 
Inflation 27 2.463 0.763 0.879 3.793 
GDP Growth 27 2.746 1.585 -3.109 4.869 
GDP Per Capita 27 10.307 0.304 9.822 10.819 
Panel B Summary statistics around IBBEA introduction  
This table presents summary of interested variables before and after the introduction of IBBEA in each state for a 10 year 
window.*, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
  Before Deregulation After Deregulation   
Difference in 
Mean 
  Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation Mean  Median 
Standard 
Deviation  After-Before 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002  0.001*** 
Z-score 24.403 20.883 16.868 25.167 21.120 17.292  0.764*** 
Capital Ratio 9.340 8.629 3.118 10.242 9.355 3.591  0.009*** 
Loan to Total Asset 58.978 59.180 19.226 66.213 66.083 19.950  0.072** 
Total Assets (million) 361.950 57.986 3278.168 875.287 102.418 8306.641  513.337*** 
Total Assets Growth Rate 7.806 5.004 15.205 10.424 6.812 16.924  2.61762*** 
Managerial Efficiency 22.148 22.195 7.687 19.387 19.216 7.601  -2.761*** 
Income Diversification 9.198 7.667 6.498 10.082 8.404 7.313    0.884*** 
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Table 2 
Correlation Matrix 
This table reports the correlation covariance. * denotes the 5% significance level. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.  
  
Geographic 
Expansion 
Index 
Discretiona
ry Loan 
Loss 
Provisions 
Z-score 
Capital 
ratio 
Loan to 
total asset 
Size 
Total 
Assets 
Growth  
Managerial 
efficiency 
Income 
diversificati
on 
Inflation 
GDP 
growth  
GDP per 
capita 
Geographic 
Expansion 
Index 
1            
Discretionary 
Loan Loss 
Provisions 
0.0728* 1           
Z-score 0.0267* -0.2257* 1          
Capital ratio 0.1970* -0.2168* 0.3399* 1         
Loan to total 
asset 
0.2542* 0.4709* -0.2191* -0.1983* 1        
Size 0.3104* 0.1196* -0.0026 -0.1127* 0.3062* 1       
Total Assets 
Growth  
0.0390* 0.1413* -0.1349* -0.0899* 0.5593* 0.1602* 1      
Managerial 
efficiency 
-0.2891* -0.1342* 0.1934* 0.2947* 0.1186* 0.2862* 0.0205* 1     
Income 
diversification 
0.1889* 0.0039 -0.1554* 0.0560* 0.0389* 0.2982* 0.0499* -0.1032* 1    
Inflation -0.4282* -0.0004 -0.0239* -0.1188* -0.0893* -0.1314* -0.0162* 0.2305* -0.1297* 1   
GDP growth  -0.1653* -0.2515* 0.0101* -0.0389* -0.0445* -0.1141* 0.0231* -0.0117* -0.0621* -0.0031 1  
GDP per capita 0.3786* -0.2058* 0.0115* 0.2171* 0.2440* 0.3250* 0.0155* -0.3318* 0.2311* -0.3904* -0.3128* 1 
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Table 3 
First Stage Partial Adjustment Model 
This table reports the results of the first-stage partial adjustment model assuming a static earnings 
adjustment speed. ROAit =λi𝛽iXit-1 + (1- λi) ROAit-1+ 𝜀it, where (1- λi) is the level of persistence of ROA. 
In column (1), we follow Fama and French (2006) and Healy et al. (2014) to use Fama-Macbeth 
regression for estimating ROA. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively. In this regression, we use the original values of these ratios instead of 
percentages. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
Dependent Variable ROAt 
ROAt-1 0.512*** 
 (22.06) 
Revenuet-1 0.005*   
 (1.74) 
Capital ratiot-1 0.066 
 (0.37) 
Loanst-1 -0.027*** 
 (-4.54)    
Total Assetst-1 -0.004**  
 (-2.21)    
Diversificationt-1 0.004*** 
 (3.42) 
Managerial Efficiencyt-1 0.129*** 
 (13.97)    
Growth of Total Assetst-1  0.002*** 
 (6.11) 
Constant -0.456** 
 (-2.02) 
  
N 77929 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
Table 4 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: a ten-year window of IBBEA     
We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent 
variables. This table presents the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment 
Model: (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi + γZit-1 ) GAPit-1 + 𝜀it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1) over the ten-year 
period in which no more than five years are distant from the IBBEA introduction year. Discretionary 
Loan Loss Provisions are the proxy for earnings management across all columns. t-statistics are in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix 
presents the definitions of variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
   
Below 
target 
Above 
target 
    GAP>0 GAP<0 
Geographic Expansion Index 0.094***  0.090*** 0.057*** 0.042*** 
 (7.38)  (8.70) (11.09) (7.11)    
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions  
-
0.178*** 
-0.176*** 0.041*** 
-
0.069*** 
  (-4.25) (-4.22) (9.66) (-10.21) 
Z-score -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.004 
-
0.116*** 
 (-1.63) (-1.21) (-1.21) (-0.68) (-12.46)    
Capital Ratio 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.022*** -0.005 0.007 
 (3.14) (3.21) (3.21) (-1.13) (1.27) 
Loan to Total Asset -0.004 -0.010 -0.010 0.062*** -0.003 
 (-0.60) (-0.96) (-0.96) (9.13) (-0.39)    
Size -0.053*** 
-
0.054*** 
-0.054*** 
-
0.051*** 
-
0.074*** 
 (-5.03) (-5.04) (-5.04) (-5.34) (-9.65)    
Total Assets Growth  0.006 0.008 0.008 
-
0.023*** 
0.021*** 
 (1.28) (1.43) (1.43) (-5.52) (3.84) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.026*** 
-
0.027*** 
-0.027*** -0.004 
-
0.072*** 
 (-4.11) (-4.22) (-4.22) (-1.09) (-11.99) 
Income Diversification -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 0.018*** 
-
0.039*** 
 (-1.03) (-1.11) (-1.11) (5.45) (-6.43)    
Inflation 0.017 0.019 0.019 
-
0.049*** 
-
0.068*** 
 (1.12) (1.34) (1.34) (-8.49) (-11.91)    
GDP Growth  0.013 0.014 0.014 
-
0.119*** 
0.019*** 
 (1.39) (1.50) (1.50) (-21.74) (3.38) 
GDP Per Capita -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
-
0.383*** 
-
0.197*** 
 (-0.06) (-0.09) (-0.09) (-25.28) (-14.22)    
Constant 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.097*** 0.850*** 0.738*** 
 (9.66) (9.70) (9.70) (54.33) (51.39) 
      
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 77929 77929 77929 128584 97513 
adj. R-sq 0.792 0.793 0.793 0.659 0.613 
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Table 5A 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed:  Robustness Analysis 
We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. This table presents the placebo tests of the OLS results for parameter estimates 
on Z in the Partial Adjustment Model: (ROAit - ROAit-1 = ( λi +γZit-1)GAPit-1 + 𝜀it, GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1). Column (1) shows the results controlling for the four years prior to the 
deregulation year. Before (4, 1) is a dummy variable equals one for year -4 to -1 relative to the deregulation year. Columns (2) displays the results under which Geographic Expansion Index 
variable is the actual index for one year prior to the actual deregulation. Column (3) displays the regression results for both large banks and their smaller counterparts. Column (4) presents the 
regression results using the full sample. Column (5) to (7) present the regression results using the sub samples, while (8) to (10) show regression results using different standard errors clustering 
method. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
 
Before(4,1) 
dummy 
Falsified one-
year before 
Geographic 
Expansion  
Index 
Full sample 
Banks with  
only one 
branch 
Banks with 
total  
assets smaller 
than  
100million 
Before  
GLB Act 
Bank-level 
clustering 
State-level 
clustering 
State-year- 
level 
clustering 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Geographic Expansion  
Index 
0.088*** -0.007 0.071*** 0.016*** 0.082*** 0.029*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 
 (18.85) (-1.36) (18.33) (3.55) (6.35) (6.16) (12.01) (3.80) (4.74) 
Before (4,1) 0.011         
 (0.05)         
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions -0.017*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.021*** -0.082*** -0.021** -0.126** -0.126* -0.126*** 
 (-3.27) (-2.58) (-5.87) (-3.14) (-5.51) (-2.19) (-2.32) (-1.89) (-2.63) 
Early Deregulation Index  0.019** 0.017**       
  (2.31) (2.21)       
Z-score -0.013*** -0.032*** -0.058*** -0.090*** -0.050*** -0.061*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.069*** 
 (-12.11) (-5.68) (-12.25) (-9.12) (-7.36) (-6.49) (-7.79) (-8.46) (-10.72) 
Leverage Ratio 0.017*** 0.017*** -0.201*** -0.001 0.004 0.019*** 0.014** 0.014** 0.014** 
 (3.64) (3.79) (-3.27) (-0.17) (0.76) (4.42) (2.26) (2.41) (2.49) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.058*** 0.000 0.049*** 0.033** 0.001 -0.007 -0.026*** -0.026** -0.026*** 
 (13.33) (0.02) (11.66) (2.62) (0.13) (-0.83) (-2.86) (-2.44) (-2.86) 
Size -0.049*** -0.076*** -0.062*** -0.092*** -0.077*** -0.106*** -0.124*** -0.124*** -0.124*** 
 (-5.62) (-8.93) (-11.57) (-6.92) (-6.83) (-9.71) (-11.90) (-13.42) (-19.08) 
Total Assets Growth  0.004 0.004 -0.011*** -0.002 0.017*** -0.002 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.85) (1.14) (-3.25) (-0.26) (3.37) (-0.38) (2.82) (3.43) (3.01) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.023*** -0.038*** -0.025*** -0.043*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.093*** -0.093*** -0.093*** 
 (-4.34) (-9.60) (-7.61) (-3.97) (-9.56) (-4.93) (-14.06) (-13.61) (-16.58) 
Income Diversification -0.010** -0.007* 0.000 -0.012* -0.013** -0.034*** -0.013** -0.013 -0.013*** 
 (-2.28) (-1.90) (0.03) (-2.00) (-2.01) (-4.77) (-2.10) (-1.64) (-2.60) 
GDP Growth  0.015 0.001 -0.075*** -0.054*** -0.114*** -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (1.62) (0.29) (-25.29) (-5.86) (-15.15) (-0.76) (-0.93) (-0.95) (-0.88) 
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Inflation 0.006 -0.019*** -0.056*** -0.029*** 0.048*** 0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.47) (-3.51) (-16.63) (-3.33) (2.97) (1.21) (0.11) (0.14) (0.08) 
GDP Per Capita -0.321*** -0.121*** -0.354*** -0.192*** -0.592*** 0.114*** 0.047 0.047 0.047 
 (-45.30) (-37.27) (-43.49) (-8.84) (-19.46) (5.75) (1.09) (1.24) (0.94) 
Constant 0.896*** 0.857*** 0.823*** 0.659*** 1.124*** 0.750*** 0.702*** 0.702*** 0.702*** 
 (80.29) (85.79) (88.14) (26.71) (24.80) (43.23) (19.55) (21.07) (16.69) 
          
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 226153 77929 226153 42942 102551 140572 77929 77929 77929 
adj. R-sq 0.826 0.808 0.701 0.777 0.614 0.826 0.697 0.697 0.697 
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Table 5B 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed:  Robustness checks 
 We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent 
variables. This table presents the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment 
Model. We use the event DID results. [ROAit - ROAit-1=(∑Beforet+∑Aftert+ γZit-1) GAPit-1+ 𝜀it, 
GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 - ROAit-1], Beforet(Aftert) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for t years before(after) 
the introduction of deregulation of a state. For example, Before5 equals 1 for year 5 before a state’s 
first time deregulation, and 0 otherwise. We apply OLS regression. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, 
**, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the 
definitions of variables.  
  (1) 
Before 5 -0.037** 
 (-2.57) 
Before 4 -0.031* 
 (-1.82) 
Before 3 0.006 
 (0.37) 
Before 2 -0.020 
 (-1.21) 
Before 1 0.011 
 (0.90) 
After 1 0.034*** 
 (2.59) 
After 2 0.258*** 
 (4.02) 
After 3 0.1190* 
 (1.78) 
After 4 0.032** 
 (2.56) 
After 5 0.008 
 (0.61) 
Discretionary Loan Loss provisions -0.113* 
 (-1.89) 
Constant 0.7585*** 
 (112.92) 
Bank Controls Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes 
N 77929 
adj. R-sq 0.687 
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Table 6 
Determinants of Bank Profit Adjustment Speed: Heterogeneity 
This table investigates the potential mechanisms between earnings adjustment speed and bank 
competition. The Geographic Expansion measure is a state level competition measure. Following Rice 
and Strahan (2010), Geographic Expansion is an index that captures the level of interstate Geographic 
Expansion for each state. All other variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** represents the 
significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Geographic Expansion  
Index *Size -0.034***    
 (-6.28)    
Geographic Expansion  
Index *Income Diversification  -0.011***   
  (-2.93)   
Geographic Expansion  
Index *Managerial Efficiency   -0.037***  
   (-5.83)  
Geographic Expansion  
Index *Z-score    -0.007*** 
    (-3.45)    
Geographic Expansion  
Index 0.056*** 0.042*** 0.057*** 0.088*** 
 (4.27) (6.68) (5.96) (7.43)    
Discretionary Loan Loss provisions -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.016*** -0.021*** 
 (-4.75) (-5.17) (-3.84) (-5.13)    
Z-score -0.086*** -0.084*** -0.090*** -0.114*** 
 (-17.28) (-16.69) (-18.56) (-11.45)    
Capital Ratio -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003    
 (-0.42) (-0.38) (-0.56) (-0.43)    
Loan to Total Asset 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.056*** 0.070*** 
 (13.62) (13.12) (10.11) (13.31)    
Size -0.033*** -0.065*** -0.070*** -0.064*** 
 (-4.02) (-12.13) (-12.95) (-12.09)    
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.018*** -0.017*** -0.010*** -0.017*** 
 (-4.75) (-4.39) (-2.63) (-4.37)    
Managerial Efficiency -0.107*** -0.042*** -0.012*** -0.036*** 
 (-5.14) (-8.38) (-2.89) (-7.52)    
Income Diversification 0.005* -0.018*** 0.004 -0.000    
 (1.80) (-2.84) (1.26) (-0.06)    
GDP Growth Rate -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.077*** -0.078*** 
 (-23.47) (-23.67) (-23.87) (-23.88)    
Inflation -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.070*** -0.074*** 
 (-21.85) (-22.31) (-22.03) (-22.60)    
GDP Per Capita -0.261*** -0.254*** -0.249*** -0.256*** 
 (-41.61) (-41.39) (-40.17) (-41.87)    
Constant 0.980*** 0.634*** 0.691*** 0.618*** 
 (18.76) (70.01) (103.31) (48.61)    
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 226153 226153 226153 226153 
adj. R-sq 0.707 0.707 0.708 0.7073  
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Table 7 
The Impact of Competition on Bank Earnings Management 
This table presents the OLS results between competition and earnings management with the full 
sample, and when the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or GAP>0). The dependent 
variable, earnings management, is measured by Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. As to 
independent variable, competition is measured by Geographic Expansion Index. *, **, *** denote 
the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    Below target Above target 
  Full Sample GAP>0 GAP<0 
Geographic Expansion Index 0.00008**  0.00000 0.00002**  
 (1.97)    (0.77) (2.32)    
Z-score -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (-10.20)    (-1.52) (-14.93) 
Leverage Ratio -0.001 0.002** -0.003*** 
 (-1.14)    (1.98) (-3.29) 
Loan to Total Asset 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 
 (131.77) (108.44) (94.53) 
Size 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (8.56) (3.41) (7.71) 
Total Assets Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-70.73)    (-49.13) (-53.47) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** 
 (-13.86) (-0.89) (-3.81) 
Income Diversification 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (4.99) (6.23) (4.07) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-89.79)    (-49.22) (-49.38) 
Inflation -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-185.22)    (-177.35) (-95.00) 
GDP Per Capita 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.044*** 
 (52.89) (30.66) (34.03) 
Constant -0.456*** -0.388*** -0.457*** 
 (-52.25)    (-29.25) (-31.92) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes     
N 214403 128584 97513 
adj. R-sq 0.776 0.778 0.771 
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Table 8 
The Impact of Competition on Bank Realized gains/losses of AFS 
This table investigates whether competition induces banks earnings management using realized 
gains/losses of available for sale securities, when the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or 
GAP>0). The dependent variable is Realized gains/losses of AFS scaled by total assets. NI is net income 
before tax and realized gains/losses of AFS scaled by total assets. The Geographic Expansion Index 
measure is a state level competition measure. All other variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** 
represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of 
variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    Below target Above target 
  Full Sample GAP>0 GAP<0 
NI -0.048*** -0.012*** -0.008*** 
 (-26.62) (-24.04) (-18.07) 
Geographic Expansion Index 0.000 0.000001* 0.000 
 (0.16) (1.69) (1.04) 
NI*Geographic Expansion Index -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (-0.83) (0.53) (1.46) 
Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions 0.035*** 0.001 0.009*** 
 (10.01) (1.19) (6.36) 
Z-score -0.000*** -0.000* 0.000 
 (-2.91) (-1.87) (1.39) 
Leverage Ratio 0.000 -0.000 0.000*** 
 (0.22) (-0.47) (3.20) 
Loan to Total Asset -0.002*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-6.34) (-7.51) (-8.48) 
Size 0.005*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (2.73) (9.52) (6.42) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (3.43) (4.59) (1.43) 
Managerial Efficiency -0.003*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-23.05) (-22.31) (-14.51) 
Income Diversification -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-7.84) (-5.38) (-3.89) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.003*** 0.000 0.000*** 
 (8.72) (1.19) (3.91) 
Inflation -0.008*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (-8.00) (-6.73) (-3.55) 
GDP Per Capita -0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (-6.67) (5.48) (1.98) 
Constant 0.001 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (1.51) (-9.50) (-5.42) 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Bank Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
N 146338 78491 47324 
adj. R-sq 0.112 0.079 0.081 
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Appendix 
Definition of Variables 
Variable Name Definition 
Earnings Management 
measure 
 
Discretionary Loan Loss 
Provisions 
The Earnings Management measures the discretionary loan loss provisions 
manipulated by each bank. It is obtained from the discretionary loan loss 
provision model (Cohen et al., 2014). We treat the absolute value of the error 
term as the earnings management indicator. The Higher the absolute residual 
value, the more earnings management the bank applied. 
Competition Measures  
Geographic Expansion 
Index 
The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) is an 
exogenous shock of competition. Followed by Rice and Strahan (2010), 
Geographic Expansion Index captures the level of interstate branching 
restrictions for each state. Before 1994, the index in each state equals to zero, 
while, after 1994, this index ranges from zero to four. The index equals to four 
for states that are most open to out-of-state entry. Then, we minus one to the 
index when a state has any of the four barriers: requiring a minimum age of 3 
or more years on the acquiring banks; not allowing de novo interstate 
branching; not permitting the acquisition of single branch or portions of an 
institution; mandating a deposit cap on branch acquisitions less than 30%. 
Thus, 4 means highest competition and 0 means lowest competition 
 
Bank-controls  
Z-score 
The Z-score is an accounting-based bank-level indicator of financial stability. 
It is measured by the sum of return of total assets and capital ratio over the 
standard deviation of return of total assets. We use 3-year rolling window to 
estimate standard deviation of ROA. Higher Z-score indicates greater 
financial stability.  
Capital Ratio The ratio of total equity to total assets 
Bank Size The natural logarithm of total assets 
Total Assets Growth  The yearly total assets growth rate 
Managerial Efficiency One minus the ratio of total cost to total income 
Income Diversification The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income 
Loans to total assets.  The ratio of total loans to total assets 
Early Deregulation Index 
Early Deregulation Index represents the wave of deregulation before IBBEA.  
This index equals zero prior to the earlier of the year of intra- or inter-state 
deregulations, one if the state deregulates either full intra-state branching 
through acquisition and de novo branching or inter-state banking, and two if 
the state deregulates both types of branching expansions. The years of these 
deregulations are gained from Kroszner and Strahan (1999). 
Macro-controls  
GDP Growth  Annual GDP growth rate 
Inflation Annual inflation rate 
GDP per capita GDP divided by the number of the people in the country 
